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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellant Virginia Hill ("Ms. Hill") appeals from a final order of the Second 
District Court for Davis County, Honorable Glen R. Dawson presiding. This Court has 
jurisdiction to hear this action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-102 (3) (j). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue: Is the Plaintiff/ Attorney entitled to a judgment against Defendant/ Client 
under the contingency fee "Legal Services Contract" entered into by the parties for one-
third of the attorney fee award granted by the District Court in a separate proceeding, plus 
one-third of the whole or primary judgment? 
Standard of Review: This court reviews Questions of Law for correctness, 
giving no deference to the lower court's legal conclusions. FN 1 
Issue Preserved in Trial Court: Such issue was preserved through the 
various filings of Ms. Hill surrounding the parties' respective motions for summary 
judgment (R. 77, 100, 102,110,123). 
DETERMINATIVE RULES 
The following rule has application in this appeal and is included in the Addendum 
due to length: -
Chapter 13, Rule L5, Utah Code of Judicial Administration (Addendum A). 
1 Spears v. Warr, 44 P.3d 742, 751 (Utah 2002). See also Emergency Physician's 
Integrated Care v. Salt Lake County, 167 P.3d 1080, 1083 (Utah 2007). 
1 
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I 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case: Plaintiff/ Appellee, Don S. Redd ("Mr. Redd") initiated < 
this suit by filing a Petition for Declaratory Judgment. Mr. Redd's primary claim is that 
in addition to receiving one-third of a judgment he aided Ms. Redd in obtaining as her 
attorney, he is also entitled to one-third of the attorney fees awarded to Ms. Redd in 
connection with such judgment. 
i 
B. Course of Proceedings: The parties each filed a motion for summary judgment, 
including a pleading of Stipulated Facts for Joint Motions for Summary Judgment. The 
trial court granted Mr. Redd's motion for summary judgment. , * 
C. Disposition in the Trial Court: On April 20, 2012, the trial court entered its 
Memorandum Ruling and Final Order. Ms. Hill filed a Notice of Appeal on May 17, 
2012. The Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to the Court of Appeals on July 2, 
2012. On August 7,2012, the Utah Supreme Court then vacated such transfer and chose 
i 
to retain this proceeding on its docket. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
n In the early 1990's Ms. Hill invested monies with certain individuals 
and/ or entities, which investment monies were not properly used for the purposes *l 
intended. Demands for the return of her money having gone unanswered, Ms. Hill 
eventually retained the services of Mr. Redd, attorney at law, to represent her in an action 
2 
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to recover her monies. (R. 149) 
As a part of securing the services of Mr. Redd a Legal Services Contract (the 
"Contract") was drafted by Mr. Redd, and signed by each of the parties on or about 
August 29, 1997. (R. 149) 
A lawsuit was then filed in August, 1997 by Mr. Redd on behalf of Ms. Hill in the 
Fourth District Court for Juab County, against Owen A. Allred and others named in that 
proceeding. (R. 149) 
Over approximately the next 13 years substantial and various legal proceedings 
ensued against the various defendants. Included in these proceedings were three 
appeals—two to the Utah Supreme Court and one bankruptcy appeal to the U.S. Circuit 
Court of Appeals. Clark Nielsen & Associates handled all of the work for the 
bankruptcy appeal, and Mr. Redd and Clark Nielsen & Associates together handled the 
work for the Utah Supreme Court appeals. In keeping with the Contract, fees for those 
services were fully paid by Ms. Hill separate and apart from the contingency fee that 
eventually became due for the judgment entered in the other proceedings in the District 
Court. (R.149) 
Ultimately, a Judgment, and then an Amended Judgment were entered, and then 
finally a Second Amended Judgment was entered on April 15,2010 for $6,144,854.79, 
plus interest at the rate of 2.41 % per annum until paid in full, which final judgment 
included punitive damages against the defendants and prejudgment interest. (R. 150) 
3 
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1 
Ms. Hill then retained in the spring of 2010 the services of Wall & Wall, Attorneys 
at Law, to represent her in proceedings from that point forward, including the remaining t 
issue before the District Court of attorney fees. [The right to attorney fees by Ms. Hill 
was granted in one of the Utah Supreme Court opinions, with the case being remanded to 
the District Court for a determination of those fees.] After remand from the Utah 
Supreme Court to the District Court the issue of attorney fees was briefed by each side, 
I 
argument held, and a decisions was rendered by the District Court that fees should be 
based upon an hourly rate charged to Ms. Hill rather than any contingent fee amount for 
which she may be responsible to her attorney. (R. 150) { 
Ms. Hill had argued to the Fourth District Court that under Utah case law the 
attorney fee should be equal to one-third of the judgment award of $6,144,854.79. The 
District Court instead ordered that for purposes of determining attorney fees owed by the 
defendants to Mrs. Hill, those fees should be based upon the Lodestar formula requiring 
i 
that attorney fees be based solely upon an hourly rate charge and not the one-third 
contingency formula. Subsequently, affidavits filed by Mr. Redd and Wall & Wall 
resulted in fees totaling $593,034.40, which amount was then entered as the attorney fee ( 
judgment by the Fourth District Court, plus interest on that amount at 2.41% per annum 
until paid in ML This did not change the fact that Ms. Hill still owed Mr. Redd one-third 
•of the initial, primary judgment of $6,144,854.79. (R. 150-151) 
Both of these judgments have now been paid in full and a Satisfaction of Judgment 
4 
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has been filed with the Fourth District Court. (R. 151) 
It has been Mr. Redd's subjective and personal understanding that he was to 
receive one-third of any and all monies paid to Ms. Hill, including one-third of any 
attorney fee award. (R. 151) 
It has been Ms. Hill's subjective and personal understanding that the contingency 
fee applied only to the final, primary judgment entered by the court, and that any 
subsequent award of attorney fees was to compensate her to the extent of the award for 
the contingency fee paid to Mr. Redd. (R. 151) 
Except for the Contract there is no evidence showing that at any time there was a 
meeting of the minds or mutual understanding by the parties as to the meaning of the 
wording in the Contract of, "Attorney is entitled to ONE THIRD (33/13%) of all monies 
paid to or in clients behalf for what ever cause related to this cause of action," as far as 
the wording's application to an award of attorney fees by the District Court. There are 
no private understandings, side agreements, or other writings evidencing any agreement 
for Mr. Redd's fees other than the said Contract. (R. 151) 
It is not disputed that the subject Contract was willingly signed by both parties, and 
that Mr. Redd is due 33 1/3% of all monies collected on the primary damage award of 
$6,144,854.79. (R. 151-152) 
It is not disputed that Ms. Hill was obligated to pay all costs for the case, including 
cost for the prior appellate proceedings. (R. 152) 
5 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The District Court erred in awarding Mr. Redd one-third of Ms. Hill's separate 
attorney fee award in addition to one-third of Ms. Hill's primary judgment because: 
1) The Contract which gave him an interest in Ms. Hill's recovery was ambiguous 
and did not specify that he was to share in any separate attorney fee award. The Contract 
could reasonably be interpreted, especially by Ms. Hill a laywoman, to only allow Mr. 
Redd to share in a portion of the underlying judgment and not any separate award of 
attorney fees. In addition, as an attorney and drafter of the Contract, such ambiguity 
should be construed exclusively against Mr. Redd. 
2) Such an award results in an unreasonable fee. Regardless of what the Contract 
states the courts retain the discretion to determine the reasonableness of the fee and the 
applicable rules limit such fee to a reasonable amount. The purpose of attorney fee 
awards is to compensate the client for the costs they had to incur to obtain the results, thus 
making the client whole. Attorney fees are not another avenue for the attorney to be 
supplemented or doubly awarded. Such a situation is inherently improper and 
unreasonable. Not only did the District court fail to find that Mr. Redd receiving 
compensation out of both the primary judgment and separate attorney fees to be 
reasonable, the District Court did not even address the issue of reasonableness of this 
application of the fee award. 
6 
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ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AWARDING MR. REDD/ATTORNEY A 
JUDGMENT AGAINST MS. HILL/ CLIENT UNDER THE CONTINGENCY FEE 
CONTRACT ENTERED INTO BY THE PARTIES FOR ONE- THIRD OF THE 
ATTORNEY FEE AWARD GRANTED BY THE DISTRICT COURT IN A 
SEPARATE PROCEEDING, PLUS ONE-THIRD OF THE WHOLE OR PRIMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
I. The trial court erred in finding that the Contract entered into by the 
parties was not ambiguous despite the fact that it can be reasonably understood to 
have two or more plausible meanings. Furthermore, such ambiguity should be 
construed against Mr. Redd, an attorney and drafter of the ambiguous Contract. 
A contract is ambiguous if it is unclear, omits terms, or if the terms used to express 
the intention of the parties may be understood to have two or more plausible meanings. 
FN2 In addition, it is the general rule that in construing a contract between attorney and 
client, doubts are resolved against the attorney and the construction adopted which is 
favorable to the client. FN3 
This proceeding hinges around the ambiguous language contained in paragraph two 
(2) of the Contract between Mr. Redd and Ms. Hill. Such paragraph reads as follows: 
"Attorney agrees to provide legal services in relation to this matter on a contingent 
fee basis which is as follows: CLIENT pays NO attorney's fees or costs unless there is 
some compensation received from this cause of action. Client will be responsible for all 
costs and out-of-pocket expenses such as depositions, filing fees, witness fees etc. from 
clients share of settlement proceeds. Attorney is entitled to ONE THIRD (33 l/3%)ofall 
monies paid to or in clients behalf for what ever cause related to this cause of action." 
2 Equitable Life & Cos. Ins. Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Utah Ct. App.1993). 
3 Parents Against Drunk Drivers v. Gray stone, 789 P.2d 52, 56 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
7 
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1 
[Emphasis and spellings as in original] 
While the Utah appellate courts have yet to specifically address this issue, many of i 
our neighboring states have directly done so. We would like to first invite the court's 
attention to the case of Luna v. Gillingham, 789 P.2d 801 (Wash. App. 1990). In that case 
the chents filed an action against their attorney claiming that he misrepresented a contingent 
fee agreement to them. The plaintiffs had prevailed in their lawsuit and Gillingham 
i 
requested an award of attorneys fees under the applicable statutes. In his attorney fee 
affidavit Gillingham disclosed his agreement to pay a legal clerk (and later bar admitted 
attorney), Jennings, $20.00 per hour, and he also informed the court of his own hourly fee. < 
The trial judge awarded attorney fees of $37,977.50, the full amount requested for 
Gillingham's and Jennings' time. The judge's oral opinion indicated that the court 
contemplated the fee award would apply as a credit against the contingent fee owed by the 
plaintiffs. 
i 
Afterwards Gillingham and Jennings met and decided how to determine the 
contingent fee owed by the chents, and they elected to add the attorney fee award to the 
base judgment award, and then take the contingent fee from that total amount because the 
language of the contingency agreement awarded Gillingham a percentage of "any gross 
recovery"—essentially the same as what Mr. Redd is attempting to do in the instant case. In 
Luna, the court construed that fee agreement as being ambiguous because it was not clear 
and did not define whether "gross recovery" referenced the judgment for damages alone or 
• 8 
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the judgment plus court-awarded attorney fees. FN4 Therefore the attorney fees should not 
have been added to the gross recovery, but rather should have been applied as a credit 
against the contingent fee owed by the plaintiffs to Gillingham under the agreement. FN5 
The Luna court observed in its opinion that, like in the instant case, 
"The Retainer Agreement does not directly address the issue of what is to be 
done with court-awarded attorneys' fees. Gillingham contends, however, that 
since it does provide he is to receive a percentage of any 'gross recovery/ 
there is no ambiguity. He claims that the term 'gross recovery' includes 
court-awarded attorneys' fees and that his contingent fee should be computed 
by adding the court awarded attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs' recovery." FN6 
However under the same analysis as Utah courts take on ambiguous contracts, they 
determined that it was ambiguous because, under the circumstances, more than one possible 
meaning could be attributed to the "gross recovery" language of the retainer agreement, 
namely that it would be exclusive of court ordered attorney fees. FN7 
This is the same scenario as we are faced with in this case. Mr. Redd's Contract 
awards him "ONE THIRD (33 1/3 %) of all monies paid to or in clients behalf for what 
ever cause related to this cause of action." However, it does not define whether such 
includes any additional awards of attorney fees or not and it can reasonably be interpreted 
both ways, particularly in this context of a contingency fee agreement. 
The Luna court looked for further direction on this point to Hamilton v. Ford Motor 
A Luna, 789 P.2d at 579-80. 
5 Id. At 581. 
6 Id. At 579. 
7 Id. At 580-81. 
9 
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1 
Co. 636 F.2d 745, 748(D.C. Cir. 1980), in which " . . . the court held that the burden be 
placed on the attorney to provide for allocation of court-awarded attorneys' fees in the I 
contingent fee agreement." Specifically they found that, "The client expects that the fee 
agreement will provide the sole source of income for the attorney. The attorney, on the other 
hand, has the technical knowledge and experience to be able to anticipate awards of 
attorneys9 fees." FN8 
Based upon this line of reasoning the Luna court held that" . . . because Gillingham 
failed to provide for allocation of court-awarded attorneys' fees in the contingent fee 
agreement, the trial court correctly ruled that the court-awarded attorneys' fees should apply i 
as a credit to the plaintiffs in computing Gillingham's contingent fee." FN9 
Construing such an agreement against the attorney, who was both the drafter and 
attorney is in keeping with Utah law, wherein we find that " . . . Any ambiguous term or 
provision should be construed against the drafter of the attorney fee agreement." FN 10 
From Phillips v. Smith, 768 P.2d 449 (Utah 1989), a case where the Utah Supreme 
Court denied relief to a law firm under a contingent fee agreement that failed to address 
subsequent representation by another firm, we find the following pronouncement by our 
Supreme Court: 
8 Hamilton, 748 F.2d at 749. 
9 Luna, 789 P.2dat581. 
10 Parents Against Drunk Drivers, 789 P.2d at 56. 
10 
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aIn interpreting the contract, we must be mindful of the general principle 
that a court will strictly construe terms in a contract against one who is 
"both the attorney draftsman of and a party to the instrument." Continental 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Bybee, 306 P.2d 773, 775 (1957). We also note that in 
the present circumstances, this principle is reinforced by the fact that the 
instrument at issue relates to an attorney/client contingent fee arrangement. 
The present Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar require 
that all contingent fee agreements be in writing. That requirement, which 
does not apply to other types of fee arrangements, reflects in part a concern 
that contingent fee arrangements are particularly likely to be misunderstood 
by clients. That concern is enhanced where the clients are unsophisticated 
with respect to legal matters as in the present case. The rule is meant to 
ensure that clients will be fully informed as to the terms and consequences 
of the contingent fee agreement." FN 11 
For further support of Ms. Hill's position in this action, we next call this court's 
attention to the matter of Chalmers v. Oregon Automobile Insurance Co., 502 P.2d 1378 
(Oregon, 1972). In Chalmers the attorney had entered into a contingent fee agreement 
with the clients but the fee agreement failed to state any specific percentage for the 
contingency fee. At the same time the insureds' action against the insurer was such that 
reasonable attorney fees were available to the prevailing party. There being no 
percentage in the fee agreement the court granted a reasonable attorney fee. As is 
currently the situation now, the Oregon court had not previously decided how an attorney 
fee award should be credited to the amount owed by the client where a contingency fee 
agreement was in place between the client and attorney. The Oregon court noted that 
absent some specific language in the fee agreement itself the fee distribution terms were 
llPM/z>y,768P.2dat451. 
11 
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ambiguous, the terms being subject to various interpretations. 
For example, is the attorney entitled to retain the attorney fee allowed by 
the court in addition to the contingent fee payable from the judgment? Or is 
the fee allowed by the court to be credited to the client as an offset in 
computing how the proceeds of the judgment are to be distributed between 
the client and his attorney? Or is the fee allowed by the court to be added 
to the amount of the judgment in determining the total amount of recovery 
subject to the contingent fee percentage? There may also be other possible 
alternatives. FN12 
Based upon these circumstances, and the manifest ambiguity in the fee agreement 
between the plaintiffs and the attorney, the Oregon Supreme Court held as follows: 
We agree that an attorney is free (subject to the provisions of the Code of 
Professional Responsibility) to negotiate such terms as he and his client 
may agree upon with reference to the manner in which awards of attorney 
fees under ORS 743.114 may be considered in relation to the amount, 
source, and distribution of any contingent fees. In such an event, there is no / 
element of surprise or other unfairness to the client. If, however, the 
contingent fee agreement makes no specific reference to any possible 
attorney fee which may be awarded by the court and makes no specific 
provision for the manner in which any such fee is to be considered in 
computing the amount, source, and manner of distribution of the contingent 
fee, we hold that any attorney fee awarded by the court shall be offset as a 
credit for deduction from the amount of the agreed contingent fee, as 
computed upon the basis of the amount of the judgment. As a result, if the 
attorney fee awarded by the court is larger than the contingent fee payable 
from the judgment, the attorney5 s compensation would be payable solely 
from the attorney fee awarded by the court and the entire amount of the 
judgment would be payable to the client. FN13 
As an attorney taking a contingent interest in potential awards given to Ms. Hill, 
Mr. Redd has the duty to clearly denote in the fee agreement all potential compensation 
12 Chalmers, 502 P.2d at 1380. 
13 Mat 1381. 
12 
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factors he considered and fully explain such to his client. His failure to do so is the direct 
result of this litigation and he should not be allowed to benefit from his own failure, 
particularly not at the great expense to his client. 
This would seem to be in keeping with Utah law, wherein it has been announced 
that "[a] court will n o t . . . make a better contract for the parties than they have made for 
themselves." FN14 The Utah Court in Rio went on to say that, "A court will not enforce 
asserted rights that are not supported by the contract itself." FN 15 
The terms of this Contract are vague and ambiguous, and therefore Mr. Redd is 
seeking to read into the contract rights and an interpretation that are not supported by the 
Contract itself. As an attorney and drafter of such Contract, Mr. Redd should be held to a 
higher standard in this regard and such ambiguity should be construed against him and in 
favor of Ms. Hill, his laywoman client. 
The trial court erred in determining that the Contract was not ambiguous and 
seemed to completely ignore the unique contractual relationship in this case - namely it 
was not two parties bargaining at arm's length, but one legally trained party with a 
fiduciary and ethical duty to the other that failed to define, specify or fully disclose his 
interpretation of the agreement they were entering into. 
Given that the parties stipulated to the facts leading up to their respective motions 
14 Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd., 618 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 1980). 
15 Id. 
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for summary judgment, after finding that the Contract is ambiguous and that such should 
be construed against Mr. Redd, it would be proper to find as a matter of law that Ms. Hill 
is entitled to summary judgment on the underlying petition as prayed for in the District 
Court. 
II. The trial court erred in failing to find that the attorney fees as proposed 
by Mr. Redd were unreasonable under the circumstances. In fact, the trial court did 
not even address such issue. 
Clearly Mr. Redd believes that the Contract is fully controlling, and he cited 
Kealamakia, Inc. v. Kealamakia, et aL, 213 P.3d 13 (Utah App. 2009) to the district court 
for that proposition. However, it has long been held that attorney fees are always subject to 
review of reasonableness by the court. Kealamakia itself clearly states that". . . the district 
court has broad discretion in determining what constitutes a reasonable fee...-." FN 16 
This position stems from Rule 1.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which 
provides in pertinent part that "[a] lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge or collect 
an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses." The rule then goes into a 
variety of factors that may be considered, which factors have been discussed an amplified 
by our courts in numerous situations, but the section quoted is the pertinent part for this case 
since there is a contingent fee arrangement between the parties in this case. 
In a general discussion of rights of an attorney under a fee agreement, it has been 
stated that: 
16 Kealamakia, 213 P.3d at 15. 
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'TSFotwithstanding such statements, however, it has been said that it is 
ingrained in the policy of determining reasonable attorney's fees, that no 
matter what fee is specified in the contract an attorney is entitled to no more 
than a reasonable fee, because an attorney, as a fiduciary, cannot bind his 
client to pay a greater compensation for his services than the attorney would 
have the right to demand if no contract had been made." [Emphasis added] 
FN17 
This general rule has been followed in Utah, as well as other jurisdictions. Our Utah 
Court of Appeals in Parents Against Drunk Drivers stated, "The existence of an attorney/ 
client relationship is governed in Utah by both the ethical rules governing attorney 
conduct and contract law." FN18 This right of the court to monitor and approve fee 
contracts between a client and attorney is one of long standing. 
In the case of Gillette v. Newhouse Realty Co..'282 P. 776 (Utah 1929) Gillette, an 
attorney, represented Bonneville Hotel Company and performed certain services under a 
contract with Bonneville. The defendant Newhouse Realty subsequently purchased 
Bonneville and agreed to be responsible for various debts of Bonneville, including debts 
related to injuries sustained by guests in an elevator accident. Gillette had contracted with 
the hotel company that they would pay him 10% of any amounts the hotel paid to the 
injured guests through judgment or compromise, regardless of whether the hotel was 
reimbursed any of such funds from the elevator manufacturer or not. The court in Gillette 
stated that, "The rale that an attorney may not by his contract of employment place 
17 7ACJS. Sec. 307, p. 588 
18 Parents Against Drunk Drivers, 789 P.2d at 54. 
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himself in a position where his own interests or the interest of another, whom he 
represents, conflict with the interests of his client, is founded upon principles of public 
policy." FN19 
While the facts of Gillette may be compared only somewhat to the instant action, 
viz. in the Contract with Ms. Hill, Mr. Redd contracted to receive a portion of monies that 
were to go to Ms. Hill to make her whole, the salient point here is that the court retained 
the right to deny relief under the contract because the terms were unreasonable and 
against public policy. Thus, the contract was not ipso facto enforceable by the attorney, 
but subject to review by the court for reasonableness and fairness. 
This same right to monitor fee contracts has been following in many other local 
jurisdictions, hi Anderson v. Kenelly, 547 P.2d 260 (Colo. App. 1976), the Colorado 
Court of Appeals dealt with a situation where a contingent fee agreement provided for a 
one-third fee in a situation where the plaintiff suing the attorney alleged that the fee was 
excessive in light of the work performed. The court agreed, ruling that "[u]nder its 
general supervisory power over attorneys as officers of the court, a court may and should 
scrutinize contingent fee contracts and determine the reasonableness of the terms 
thereof." FN20 While we do not dispute the extent of work Mr. Redd performed, nor his 
right to one-third of a judgment exceeding $6 million dollars, we feel that anything 
19 Gillette, 282 P. at 779. 
20 Anderson, 547 P.2d at 261. 
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beyond that is clearly excessive, unreasonable, and subject to review by the court. 
At this juncture we would like to come back again to Rule 1.5 of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct and its application as to reasonableness of fees. In the Matter of 
Struthers, 877 P.2d 789 (Ariz. 1994), the Arizona Supreme Court dealt with a variety of 
issues concerning an attorney's dealings with his client, but one issue the court felt deserved 
particular attention involved a situation where the attorney in the case had a contingency fee 
agreement that contracted for the attorney to take from the judgment his contingency fee 
PLUS any court awarded attorney fee. (This is one of the possible outcomes observed as 
possible interpretations in the Oregon and Washington court rulings cited above.) The 
Arizona court ruled as follows: 
"Such an arrangement would tend to mislead the awarding court as to 
Strutters' fee agreement, because a court would not award attorney's fees if it 
knew that the award would result in double recovery for the attorney and no 
benefit to the client The purpose of awarding fees to a successful litigant is 
not to provide the lawyer with a double payment bonus but to defray the 
client's litigation expenses." [Emphasis added.] FN21 
While this is seemingly a stricter standard than the Washington or Oregon courts 
took, we submit that it is the correct position to be taken on as issue such as is presented 
to the Court in this case. While there certainly should be no wrongdoing attached to Mr. 
Redd in drafting his agreement as there was in the Arizona case, the central issue still 
resolves around the right of the courts to determine a correct fee. As the Oregon court 
21 Struthersf 877 P.2d at 795. 
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noted in Chalmers, no blame should attach to the attorney in that case because the Oregon 
court had never ruled on the efficacy of a contingency fee contract that provided for the < 
attorney taking the contingency fee plus some portion of the attorney fee award granted 
by the lower court. We find no Utah cases directly on point for this issue. 
However, as the Arizona court went on to state in Struthers the whole concept of 
awarding attorney fees in any case is "to mitigate the burden of the expense of litigation 
i 
to establish a just claim or as a just defense." FN22 As Struthers observed, such a fee 
arrangement is "inherently improper." FN23 If the attorney fee award is to help make 
the litigating party whole, then any time an attorney takes any portion of that fee award in 
addition to the contingency amount the fee is no longer a fee to compensate the litigating 
party but to some varying degree a bonus for the attorney. Thus, the fee no longer is 
attorney fees, but attorney's fees. This was never the intention when such an award was 
created by the courts and legislatures. 
This, contrary to Mr. Redd's assertions, is also what we believe to be the proper 
interpretation Kealamakia. In that case the plaintiff corporation sued members of the 
Kealamakia family for breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, unjust enrichment, and 
conversion of corporate assets. The district court found that William and Nadine 
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$35,000.00, and awarded attorney fees. A judgment against Joseph Kealamakia was also 
granted for $36,403.10. A subsequent order set the amounts of the attorney fees, 
providing that "(1) the contingency fee agreement amount of 40% was the maximum 
amount that Plaintiff could recover in an attorney fee award, and (2) the 40% figure--
$134,743.44—was a reasonable attorney fee under the circumstances " FN24 
The defendants argued that it was improper to award attorney fees because of the 
contingency fee agreement which provided that the fee is to come out of the "total gross 
recovery." Defendants argued that a separate attorney fee award rewrites the contract, 
with which contention the Utah Court of Appeals disagreed. The Kealamakia court then 
stated as follows: 
"First, we note that Defendants' characterization of the language of the 
contingency fee agreement is incorrect. The agreement simply provides 
that Plaintiff must compensate its attorneys by paying them "40% of gross 
amounts recovered." There is no language that would require that amount 
to be paid from recovery as opposed to being paid from a separate award of 
attorney fees. Indeed, the agreement contemplates the possibility that such 
a separate award may be granted where it states, "In no event will you 
compensate us less than the amount of any attorney fees awarded by the 
Court." [Emphasis added.] FN25 
Several paragraphs later the Utah Court of Appeals follows with this language: 
"The trial court's award of attorney fees to Plaintiff does not alter the contract 
between Plaintiff and its attorneys in any way. Rather, Plaintiff remains 
obligated to pay its attorneys according to the terms of the contingency fee 
agreement. The fact that the money will come in the form of a separate 
award, allowing Plaintiff to be made whole, does not change any rights or 
24 Kealamakia, 213 P.3dat 14. 
25 Id. zt\5. 
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obligations provided for in the contract." [Emphasis added.] FN26 
It is here that Ms. Hill diverges with Mr. Redd in his interpretation of Kealamakia. ( 
Mr. Redd in this instant action takes the position that Kealamakia stands, in part, for the 
proposition that an attorney is entitled to whatever his fee contract may provide, and if it 
provides for a recovery from the gross recovery then that includes the attorney fee award as 
well, even if it does not specify such. Kealamakia makes no such holding. There is nothing 
whatsoever in the case to indicate that the attorneys for plaintiff sought to recover 40% of 
the base recovery PLUS 40% of the separate $134,743.44 attorney fee award granted by the 
district court. If such an issue ever arose between the parties it is not in any way manifested 
in the appellate court ruling. Indeed, what we do see in the ruling is that the separate 
attorney fee award was granted for the purpose of " . . . allowing Plaintiff to be made 
whole" [Emphasis added]. FN27 This necessarily imphes that the attorneys were not going 
to receive anything from the primary judgment. .This is further emphasized by Kealamakia 
wherein it is stated that " . . . we recognize the public policy that the basic purpose of 
attorney fees is to indemnify the prevailing party and not to punish the losing party by 
allowing the winner a windfall profit." FN28 
In the instant action if Mr. Redd takes a percentage of the attorney fee award in 
addition to a percentage of the base judgment then he is thwarting the purpose of the award, 
26 Id. at 15-16. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 17. 
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that being to make the party/ client whole. The attorney fee award is for the party who 
incurred a bill with an attorney, not the attorney. If Ms. Hill would not have been awarded 
attorney fees, Mr. Redd still would be compensated through the primary judgment, he had 
no risk with respect to the separate attorney fee award. If Mr. Redd is awarded a share then 
the attorney fee award becomes a bonus to him, and the attorney fee award becomes an 
award for the benefit of Mr. Redd and not as compensating Ms. Hill for the costs she 
incurred by having to bring the suit. That is not the purpose of attorney fees. "Attorney fee 
awards are means to 'vindicate personal claims' rather than means to 'generate fees.5" 
FN29 . 
Along this same line of thinking the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently 
recognized that a "reasonable" fee is one that is to be a "fully compensatory fee." FN30 
For a fee to be fully compensatory the attorney representing the party should not be 
entitled to a share of that fee on top of a contingency fee already paid. If the attorney is 
so allowed, then the fee is neither fully compensatory nor reasonable. 
It is well understood that ". . . a statutory fee award is separate from the plaintiffs 
recovery." FN31 We reiterate that an attorney fee award is an effort to make the client 
whole as much as possible—to compensate to some degree for the fees paid by the client to 
29 Id. citing Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366, 1375 
(Utah 1996). 
30 Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,425 (1983). 
31 Warnell, et al v. Ford Motor Co., et al, 205 F.Supp.2d 956, 960 (No. Dist 111. 2002). 
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his or her attorney. It is not intended as an additional source of funds for the attorney in a 
contingency fee case. "Fees awarded out of a common fund are a substitute for, not a < 
supplement to, a contingent fee." FN32 
In the Warnell v. Ford Motor Co, case an award of $9 million was given to the
 i 
plaintiffs' class, and an additional $3 million was awarded to cover all fees and costs. Issues 
developed over whether the attorneys for plaintiffs were entitled to enforce a contingency fee 
agreement with some of the members of the class from the $9 million in addition to the $3 
million awarded for just such fees. This resulted, in part, in a characterization by the court of 
the attorney fees sought by the attorneys as being "double dipping." FN33 As the court 
noted in Warnell the award would not have been approved had the court known that the 
attorneys sought both the statutory attorney fee plus the contingency fee out of the underlying 
judgment. In examining the fees being sought by the attorneys the court in Warnell noted 
that, "This is all by way of saying that I would nfever have approved a settlement that required 
the named plaintiffs to shoulder the burden of their attorneys1 fees to a significantly greater 
extent than the rest of the class where the class got a significantly greater benefit. The total 
fees collected are thus unreasonable." Emphasis added. FN34 x 
While it is true that Warnell was a situation where the attorneys were entitled to the 
33 J i at 962. 
34/* . V's- ''-\V' : -
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award of the court of attorney fees, the court held the attorneys were NOT entitled to a 
contingency on the primary award. They were not entitled to both. The facts are flipped in 
this case but we submit that the principle holds true for this case as well—the attorney is not 
entitled to both the court awarded attorney fees in addition to the contingency amount on the 
primary judgment, particularly when the fee agreement does not specifically delineate such. 
We again emphasize that the principle behind awarding an attorney's fee is to 
compensate the client, not the attorney. In the U.S. Supreme Court case ofCity of Burlington 
v. Ernest Dague, SR., et al, 505 U.S. 557 (1992), the Court observed that" . . . this Court 
consistently has recognized that a "reasonable fee is to be a fully compensatory fee, and is to 
be calculated on the basis of rates and practices prevailing in the relevant market." FN35 
Clearly a fee charged against both the principle judgment plus a portion of the attorney fee 
award does not result in a "full compensatory fee" since it merely enhances the standard 
contingent fee already being charged by the attorney at the sole expense of the client. 
As this court is well aware, attorney's fees are to be reasonable. Rule 1.5(a) of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct in part provides that "[a] lawyer shall not make an 
agreement for, charge or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for 
expenses." The Rule then goes on to list the various factors generally considered in 
determining the reasonableness of a fee. As an example where the factors were 
considered we cite this court to the U.S. Supreme Court case of Blanchard v. Bergeraon, 
35 Burlington, 505 U.S. at 567. 
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et al., 489 U.S. 87 (1989), wherein the court held that in determining whether a fee is 
reasonable, the court should look at the "time expended on a matter," plus the following < 
factors: 
"(1) the time and labor; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) 
the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of i 
other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the 
customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time 
limitations (8) the amount involved and results obtained; (9) the experience, 
reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the "undesirability" of the case;
 { 
(11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; 
and (12) awards in similar cases." FN36 
In this case it is the position of Mr. Redd that the fee agreement provision 
providing that the "[a]ttomey is entitled to ONE THIRD (33 1/3%) of all monies paid to 
or in clients behalf for what ever cause related to this cause of action" entitles him to one-
third of the attorney fee award. This is neither reasonable, nor was it ever the 
understanding of Ms. Hill that she would be paying anything more than one-third of any 
base judgment awarded due to the cause of action filed. Any attorney fees awarded were 
to compensate her to some degree to the large one-third fee Mr. Redd would be receiving 
if they prevailed. Despite the fact that the original District Court found that a 
"reasonable" attorney fee for Ms. Hill was only $593,034.40, Ms. Hill has not even 
attempted to limit Mr. Redd's fee to such amount. Conversely, she has comphed with the 
terms of the Contract and provided Mr. Redd with an attorney fee of more than two 
36 Blanchard, 489 U.S. at 91-92. 
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million dollars ($2,000,000.00), an amount that results in more than triple what Mr. Redd 
would have received by charging his hourly rate alone. Even if Mr. Redd does not 
receive the additional approximately $200,000.00 he is seeking in this proceeding, he has 
already been more than compensated. On the other hand, the untouched $593,034.40 
attorney fee award does not even come close to making Ms. Hill whole - in the realm of 
attorney fees she is already sitting at over a 1.4 million dollar deficit. 
Under such a scenario the District Court could not have correctly found that Mr. 
Redd sharing in the separate attorney fee award was reasonable. Compounding such error 
is the fact that the District Court did not even address such factor in awarding Mr. Redd 
the unreasonable fee. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court erred in awarding Mr. Redd one-third of Ms. Hill's separate 
attorney fee award in addition to one-third of Ms. Hill's primary judgment because the 
Contract which gave him an interest in Ms. Hill's recovery was ambiguous and did not 
specify that he was to share in any such attorney fee award. The Contract could 
reasonably be interpreted, especially by Ms. Hill a laywoman, to only allow Mr. Redd to 
share in a portion of the underlying judgment and not any separate award of attorney fees. 
In addition, as an attorney and drafter of the Contract, such ambiguity should be 
construed exclusively against Mr. Redd. 
Moreover, even if the Contract was not ambiguous, such an award results in an 
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unreasonable fee under the circumstances. Regardless of what the Contract states the 
courts retain the discretion to determine the reasonableness of the fee and the applicable 
rules limit such fee to a reasonable amount. The purpose of attorney fee awards is to 
compensate the client for the costs they had to incur to obtain the results, thus making the 
client whole. Attorney fees are not another avenue for the attorney to be supplemented or 
doubly awarded. Such a situation is inherently improper and unreasonable. The attorney 
fee award already does not even come close to making Ms. Hill whole, further 
diminishing such compensation is completely unreasonable under the circumstances. Not 
only did the District court fail to find that Mr. Redd receiving fees out of both the primary 
judgment and separate attorney fees to be reasonable, the District Court did not even 
address the issue of reasonableness. r 
For the aforementioned reasons the District Court's order should be overturned 
and Ms. Hill's Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted. 
RESPECTFULLLY SUBMITTED t h i s s 3 / ^ y of October, 2012. 
l,aP.C. 
iey for Defendant/Appellant 
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Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Chapter 13 
Rule 1.5. Fees. 
(a) A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge or collect an unreasonable fee or an 
unreasonable amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in determining the 
reasonableness of a fee include the following: 
(a)(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved 
and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; 
(a)(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular 
employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; 
(a)(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; 
(a)(4) the amount involved and the results obtained; 
(a)(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; 
(a)(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; 
(a)(7) the experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the 
services; and 
(a)(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
(b) The scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee and expenses for which 
the client will be responsible shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, 
before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation, except when the 
lawyer will charge a regularly represented client on the same basis or rate. Any changes 
in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses shall also be communicated to the client. 
(c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is 
rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or 
other law. A contingent fee agreement shall be in a writing signed by the client and shall 
state the method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or 
percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal; 
litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery; and whether such 
expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated. The 
agreement must clearly notify the client of any expenses for which the client will be 
liable whether or not the client is the prevailing party. Upon conclusion of a contingent 
fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement stating the 
outcome of the matter and, if there is a recovery, showing the remittance to the client and 
the method of its determination. 
(d) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge or collect: 
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(d)(1) any fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or amount of which is 
contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony or support, or 
property settlement in lieu thereof; or < 
(d)(2) a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case. 
(e) A division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only 
if: 
i 
(e)(1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or each 
lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation; 
(e)(2) the client agrees to the arrangement, including the share each lawyer will receive, 
and the agreement is confirmed in writing; and(e)(3) the total fee is reasonable. 
Comment 
Reasonableness of Fee and Expenses 
[1] Paragraph (a) requires that lawyers charge fees that are reasonable under the 
circumstances. The factors specified in (a)(1) through (a)(8) are not exclusive. Nor will 
each factor be relevant in each instance. Paragraph (a) also requires that expenses for 
which the client will be charged must be reasonable. A lawyer may seek reimbursement 
for the cost of services performed in-house, such as copying, or for other expenses 
incurred in-house, such as telephone charges, either by charging a reasonable amount to 
which the client has agreed in advance or by charging an amount that reasonably reflects 
the cost incurred by the lawyer. 
Basis or Rate of Fee 
[2] When the lawyer has regularly represented a client, they ordinarily will have evolved 
an understanding concerning the basis or rate of the fee and the expenses for which the 
client will be responsible. In a new client-lawyer relationship, however, an understanding 
as to fees and expenses must be promptly established. Generally, it is desirable to furnish 
the client with at least a simple memorandum or copy of the lawyer's customary fee 
arrangements that states the general nature of the legal services to be provided, the basis, 
rate or total amount of the fee and whether and to what extent the client will be 
responsible for any costs, expenses or disbursements in the course of the representation. 
A written statement concerning the terms of the engagement reduces the possibility of 
misunderstanding. 
[3] Contingent fees, like any other fees, are subject to the reasonableness standard of 
paragraph (a) of this Rule. In detenriining whether a particular contingent fee is 
reasonable, or whether it is reasonable to charge any form of contingent fee, a lawyer 
must consider the factors that are relevant under the circumstances. Applicable law may 
impose limitations on contingent fees, such as a ceiling on the percentage allowable, or 
may require a lawyer to offer clients an alternative basis for the fee. Applicable law also 
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may apply to situations other than a contingent fee, for example, government regulations 
regarding fees in certain tax matters. 
Terms of Payment 
[4] A lawyer may require advance payment of a fee but is obligated to return any 
unearned portion. See Rule 1.16(d). A lawyer may accept property in payment for 
services, such as an ownership interest in an enterprise, providing this does not involve 
acquisition of a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of the 
litigation contrary to Rule 1.8(i). However, a fee paid in property instead of money may 
be subject to the requirements of Rule 1.8(a) because such fees often have the essential 
qualities of a business transaction with the client. 
[5] An agreement may not be made whose terms might induce the lawyer improperly to 
curtail services for the client or perform them in a way contrary to the client's interest. 
For example, a lawyer should not enter into an agreement whereby services are to be 
provided only up to a stated amount when it is foreseeable that more extensive services 
probably will be required, unless the situation is adequately explained to the client. 
Otherwise, the client might have to bargain for further assistance in the midst of a 
proceeding or transaction. However, it is proper to define the extent of services in light of 
the client's ability to pay. A lawyer should not exploit a fee arrangement based primarily 
on hourly charges by using wasteful procedures. 
Prohibited Contingent Fees 
[6] Paragraph (d) prohibits a lawyer from charging a contingent fee in a domestic 
relations matter when payment is contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the 
amount of alimony or support or property settlement to be obtained. This provision does 
not preclude a contract for a contingent fee for legal representation in connection with the 
recovery of post-judgment balances due under support, alimony or other financial orders 
because such contracts do not implicate the same policy concerns. 
Division of Fees 
[7] A division of fee is a single billing to a client covering the fee of two or more lawyers 
who are not in the same firm. A division of fee facilitates association of more than one 
lawyer in a matter in which neither alone could serve the client as well, and most often is 
used when the fee is contingent and the division is between a referring lawyer and a trial 
specialist. Paragraph (e) permits the lawyers to divide a fee either on the basis of the 
proportion of services they render or if each lawyer assumes responsibility for the 
representation as a whole. In addition, the client must agree to the arrangement, including 
the share that each lawyer is to receive, and the agreement must be confirmed in writing. 
Contingent fee agreements must be in a writing signed by the client and must otherwise 
comply with paragraph (c) of this Rule. Joint responsibility for the representation entails 
financial and ethical responsibility for the representation as if the lawyers were associated 
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in a partnership. A lawyer should only refer a matter to a lawyer whom the referring 
lawyer reasonably believes is competent to handle the matter. See Rule 1.1. 
[8] Paragraph (e) does not prohibit or regulate division of fees to be received in the future 
for work done when lawyers were previously associated in a law firm. 
Disputes over Fees 
[9] If a procedure has been established for resolution of fee disputes, such as an 
arbitration or mediation procedure established by the Bar, the lawyer must comply with 
the procedure when it is mandatory, and, even when it is voluntary, the lawyer should 
conscientiously consider submitting to it. Law may prescribe a procedure for determining 
a lawyer's fee, for example, in representation of an executor or administrator, a class or a 
person entitled to a reasonable fee as part of the measure of damages. The lawyer entitled 
to such a fee and a lawyer representing another party concerned with the fee should 
comply with the prescribed procedure. 
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"SECOND 
| niRTRICTCOURT J 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
DON S. REDD, 
Plaintiff, 
'•" v s . : •* i* 
VIRGINIA HILL, 
Defendant 
MEMORANDUM RULING & FINAL 
ORDER 
Case No.: 110702023 
Judge: GLEN R. DAWSON 
This matter is before the Court on cross motions for summary judgment. The Court 
having thoroughly reviewed the case file and pertinent legal authorities makes the following 
Ruling. 
Background 
The dispute in this case arises from a disagreement between the parties as to the extent to 
which a contingency fee agreerneiit affects the award of Attorney's fees in Virginia Hill v. Owen 
Allred, et al^ Case No. 970400153. It is not disputed that a contingency fee agreement was 
willingly signed by both parties and that Plaintiff is entitled to 33 1/3% of an award to Defendant 
of $6,144,854.79. The only dispute before the Court is whether Plaintiff should receive, 
pursuant to the contingency fee agreement, a further award of 33 1/3% from the $593,034.40 
awarded for attorney's fees. 
1 
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"Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). In 
this case, the parties have submitted a stipulated set of undisputed facts. Accordingly, there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and the Court may make a judgment as a matter of law. 
In general, "fee agreements between lawyers and clients should be carefully scrutinized 
to ensure that they are fair..." Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawsonr92} P.2d 
1366,1372 (Utah 1996). When "construing a contract between attorney and client, doubts are 
resolved against the attorney and the construction adopted which is favorable to the client." Id. 
This rule often applies in cases where a fee agreement is alleged to contain an ambiguity. Id. A 
contract is ambiguous "if it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation because of 
uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies." Glenn v. Reese, 2009 
UT 80, K 10,225 P.3d 185 (quoting Cafe Rio, Inc. v. Larkin-Giffbrd-Overton, LLC, 2009 UT 27, 
\ 25,207 P.3d 1235). If the language of the contract is unambiguous, "the parties' intentions 
are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language, and the contract may be 
interpreted as a matter of law." Id. 
The specific language of the fee agreement at issue states, "[a]ttorney is entitled to ONE 
THIRD (33 1/3 %) of all monies paid to or in clients behalf for what ever [sic] cause related to 
this cause of action." In this Court's view the language in the fee agreement is unambiguous, it 
2 
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applies the contingency fee to all money paid to the client for whatever cause. The plain 
meaning of the contingency fee agreement is that the 33 1/3% would apply to any award or 
judgment, whether for general damages, punitive damages, or attorney's fees. As the language is 
clear, the only possible interpretation is that Plaintiff should receive 33 1/3% of the $593,034.40 
in attorney's fees awarded to Defendant in the prior action. 
For tlie forgoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is granted and 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied. 
Final Order 
Based on the foregoing ruling, IT IS HEREBY ORDRED that Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment is GRANTED in its entirety and Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment is DENIED. 
It is FURTHERED ORDERED that Plaintiff is awarded a Declaratory Judgment in the 
amount of 33 1/3% of the $593,034.40 in attorney's fees awarded in Virginia Hill v. Owen 
Alfred, et al, Case No. 970400153. This Order and Judgment is a final order and no additional 
order is necessary. 
Dated this l ( ^ u day of April 2012. 
BY THE COURT: 
>^^^^.C)<3a 
GLENR. DAWSON J 51 
DISTRICT COURT JUD*3E\ ™ , . 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum Ruling and 
Final Order this / " day of April 2012, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Stephen I. Oda, Esq. 
44 N. Main Street 
Layton, Utah 84041 
Gregory B. Wall, Esq. 
Cory R. Wall, Esq. 
Wall & Wall PC 
2168 East Fort Union Blvd. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
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